

Transformation Of The Dynamics Of Village And Regency Political Power Relations In The Realm Of Village Expansion Policy In East Lombok Regency, Ntb

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Abstract. This study aims to describe the dynamics of the power relations between villages and districts as the impact of village expansion in East Lombok Regency, West Nusa Tenggara, villages and how the construction of power relations must be carried out by villages and districts. The position of the village has been strengthened with the enactment of Law Number 6 of 2014 concerning Villages and the latest amendment with Law Number 3 of 2024. With this law, villages have a high level of confidence, for several reasons, including: the identity of villages and customary villages is clarified; the state recognizes authority based on the right of origin of the village and local-scale authority (subordination); villages are budgeted through the State Budget in the form of Village Funds (DD); The opening of opportunities for the emergence of new elites in the village as a result of political liberation. The method used is in the form of a qualitative approach with data collection techniques through interviews, observations, *FGDs* and document data analysis and analyzed using the Miles and Huberman model. The results of the study show that the dynamics of the power relationship between villages and districts in East Lombok are very dynamic; Villages are beginning to be consolidated internally because some of the resources they have and the pattern of mutually beneficial relations between villages and districts are rational choices to build power relations that strengthen each other in running the government.

Keywords: *power relations, districts, villages, developers*

I. INTRODUCTION

The power relations between villages and districts in Indonesia are a complex and interesting topic. The lowest government structure is the village. Village government has its own perspective called community, with characteristics including small scale, very high levels of geneolity, simple political life with a high level of obedience to leaders [1]. While on the one hand, the state has its own paradigm regarding the implementation of autonomy and decentralization which has broad implications for villages (Duncan 2007). The dynamics of power relations between villages and districts can be seen from several things: First, how is the implementation of decentralization and regional autonomy [2], [3]; (Eaton 2006); (Dick-Sagoe 2020); (Almeida et al. 2024); (Dick-Sagoe 2020). Second, the power relations that are dependent on the village to the district include: economic dependence; the influence of local government policies, development programs initiated by the government, district government, and province often have to be implemented at the village level. [4]; [5]. The power relations between villages and districts are also related to community participation and involvement in the decision-

making process. [6]; [7]; [8]; (Budi Hendrati et al. 2024). The dynamics of the power relations between villages and districts are also inseparable from conflicts over the management of Natural Resources [9]; [10]. The power relations built between villages and districts also have cultural and social impacts that can trigger social change, both positive and negative, in the structure of village society [11]; [12]. Other conditions also faced by villages are lack of resources (Hutapea and Claudia 2022); (Ramli 2020). This study was conducted in order to complement the various shortcomings made by previous research. In previous research, the focus was on several issues, including the dynamics of the relationship between the state and the village using a historical approach to monumental works [13]. The work [14] with the theme "State in the Village", clearly illustrates how state centralism and authoritarianism work above the local. The work [15], shows the state's exploitation and oppression of village communities during the New Order era, (Dwipayana, AAGN Ari, Andi Sandi, Arie Sujito, Bambang Hudayana, Krisdyatmiko, Sutaryono, Sutoro Eko 2013);[16] as quoted by (Tahir 2005). The colonial power relations as described by [17] that there has been capitalization, exploitation, and social differentiation in

the village. (Ni"matul Huda 2015);(All, Ramlan and Sihombing 2021) from [18];(Rochmad Effendy 1981), (All, Ramlan and Sihombing 2021), (Turmudi 2017); (Haw Widjaja: 2003); (Alamsyah 2011) as quoted from [19]. (Berenschot and Sambukan 2017) village heads during the New Order era had central access to all community interests such as health care, education, welfare support and even work had to go through the recommendation of the village head. Second, the weak role of democratic institutions at the village level, especially the legislative institution, namely the BPD [20]; (Tokan 2020); (Suryawan 2020). Reform encourages more open relations between village and state power and provides opportunities for villages to manage themselves based on original autonomy [21]. [22]; [23]. [24] The relationship between the supra village, in this case the district and the village, is still unbalanced [25]; [26]; [27]. [28]; [29]. The third focus, namely the relationship between villages and districts, is with a legal norm approach (Kushandajani 2015). Villages can no longer be just the smallest areas under the sub-district, but an autonomous "region" with its own authority and budget (Suryani 2020). Behind some of the hopes above, several concerns were revealed regarding implementation (K. Kushandajani 2015). Institutionally, villages are regulated by the Ministry of Home Affairs and programs are regulated by the Ministry of Villages. potential weaknesses such as the issue of village head education, the term of office of the village head is too long, 6 years and three periods (18 years) (Labolo 2017), even APDESI (Association of Village Governments of All Indonesia) proposed a term of office of 9 years and 3 periods (27 years) as quoted by [30]. This concern certainly has a strong reason where Indonesia has had a bitter experience of how power that is too long leads to the injury of democracy and produces horizontal conflict [31].

The debate on the relationship between village and state power is also faced with the workings of the concept of autonomy. The practice of autonomy in Indonesia implements two concepts of autonomy, namely granted autonomy and original autonomy [22]. If traced further, the village in Sanskrit means homeland, land of origin, or land of birth [32]; [33]. (Barniat 2019); (Haw Widjaja: 2003); Although there is debate for example (Turmudi 2017) [34]. Second, the impact of the provision of quite large stimulus funds by the state is that there is a very strong desire to expand villages, [35]. (Yuningsih and Subekti 2016).

Further research has looked at how the power relations between villages and districts in the context of democratic life, namely the election of village heads. Strengthening the argument of the second opinion [36] states that: "democracy in the village is not Western Democracy, but rather the original democracy of primitive societies that are not yet familiar with social stratification [37]. He argued that democracy is best practiced at the lowest level of government and that the village level is the most appropriate level for democratic practice (Fathudin, Abu Tharim 2020);

(Martha 2020); [38]. The existence of the BPD as an institutionalization of democracy in the village is rather difficult to expect to aggregate and articulate the aspirations of the village community because its bargaining position is still weak (Putra and Hapsari 2020), (Rozaki. A. & Yulianto 2015). The structure of village government is built solely as a tool to achieve the goal of power domination, resulting in the neglect of local values which are actually the basis for the life together of the village community (Kushandajani 2011); (Abdullah 2016); (Bihuku 2018);[39];(Hariyati, Holidin, and Mulia 2021);(Wance and Djae 2019). ; (Lesmana Rian Andhika 2017);(Hidayat 2018) compete using two main forces, namely material power represented by oligarchy and non-material power/mystical/supernatural power, the same conclusion is also by (Aspinall and Rohman 2017);(Harianto and Rahardjo 2019).(Ansori and M.Si. 2019);(Siswandani and Prasetyo 2022);(Mursyidin, Vellayati Hajad 2022);(J. Kingsley 2012).

The four previous research focuses were the shift in village elites due to the impact of liberal democracy in the village (Berenschot and Sambukan 2017) the central position of the village head began to decrease, resulting in a change in the mindset/way of thinking of the village head from serving the state to serving the community. village heads can no longer rely on the support of state apparatus, because anyone can criticize/speak about the village head's mistakes/errors and it is not easy to suppress critical voices, the fear of the community has disappeared. Third, Indonesia's democratization process has multiplied the channels that people can use to access state resources, and new elites have emerged in the village (Berenschot and Sambukan 2017) The Village Law has mandated the transfer of funds to villages amounting to 1 (one) billion (Village Funds/DD). (Tjahjoko 2015).; (Berenschot et al. 2021); [40]; [41]; (Kisworo and Shauki 2019).

The formulation in this study covers two aspects, namely (1) the dynamics of village and district power relations in the village expansion policy in East Lombok Regency. (2) conceptual reconstruction of village and district power relations that provide broad space for the implementation of village autonomy and at the same time maintain village and district harmony. The urgency of conducting research means that this research is important to analyze or explore the pattern of political power relations. What kind of political relations will be built and implemented by the district with the village or vice versa, the village head with the district.

The novelty of this research is divided into two, namely first, the novelty of the context of the research phenomenon and the research locus. From several studies on village and district power relations, there has been no research that discusses village and supra-village political relations after the patron-client political relations that are pragmatic or normative, so the researcher considers this important to be studied based on the political facts that occur as described above.

To construct how the pattern of political relations is, the author uses several theories including democracy theory, political relations theory, local political theory, power theory, elite theory, and resistance theory. The theory of grassroots democracy is the theory chosen because this theory has the same view as used in research by (Martha 2020), (Wang 2016), (Zhou 2018), (Paskarina, Asiah, and Madung 2015), (Aditya Perdana 2009). Second, is the theory of political/power relations. (Wance and Djae 2019). Third, local political theory, [42]. Fourth, power theory. (Haryanto 2017).

The implementation of regional autonomy based on Law Number 23 of 2014, according to Rozali Abdullah as quoted by (Tommy Andana, Siti Aminah, Otto Trengginas Setiawan 2018) with the principle of broad, real and responsible autonomy. Broad autonomy, means that the KDH is given the task, authority, rights and obligations to handle government affairs that are not handled by the central government. Real autonomy is a task, authority and obligation to handle government affairs that actually exist and have the potential to grow and develop in accordance with the potential and characteristics of each region. Responsible autonomy, that in the implementation of autonomy must be in line with the purpose of granting autonomy, which is basically to empower the region, including improving people's welfare. [43]; [44].

Bourdieu (Ritzer and Goodmann, 2004), offers a theory of power called the theory of symbolic power. This theory sees the relationship of state power implementing symbolic mechanisms to form and enforce power outside of repressive and coercive mechanisms. Symbolic power is closely related to symbolic capital, because symbolic power can only be carried out by individuals or groups who have symbolic capital. Capital is a social relation that exists in a system of exchange, both material and symbolic, without any difference. Foucault then differentiates power relations into three parts, namely: a) Power relations as "strategic games" between independent parties. Power at this level only involves parties who have freedom, so there is no domination carried out in this power relation, purely as a strategic game. In this conception, power "determines the relationship between partners" in an ensemble of actions. b) Causal relations as "domination" (Alfirdaus, Hiariej, and Farsijana Adeney-Risakotta 2015). c) Relations as a form of "government". The concept of government is mainly associated with the concept of leading, in the sense of directing or controlling Action (Kurzweil, 2004), (Wance and Djae 2019). Foucault concluded that power is everywhere and comes from everywhere (Siregar 2021). While Gramsci comes with the theory of hegemony and domination (Alfirdaus et al. 2015). Domination according to Gramsci, power is enforced by violence, for example using military power, soldiers, prisons, and so on. On the other hand, the hegemony of power is enforced subtly, which Foucault calls governmentality.

Another theory used is the theories of conflict and power used to analyze the problems of this research, so the theory of resistance is an inseparable part theoretically in this

research. The argument is that if there is a discussion about the dominance of the power structure, then the antithesis is resistance from the dominated community or group. In this context, the theory of resistance is very relevant as a basis for analysis in the problem of research on political relations between villages and districts in East Lombok Regency.

I. METHOD RESEARCH

In writing this research, the author uses a qualitative method with a phenomenological qualitative approach. Implementatively, the method in this research uses a case study, interpretative, and descriptive approach. The case study was taken to see in detail how the pattern of political relations practiced by district elites and village elites in East Lombok Regency with the enactment of the village law. Qualitative methods that produce descriptive data are in the form of words from the author or spoken by people and observable behavior (Lexy J. Moleong, 1990. Page 3). The location of the research is in the East Lombok Regency Government and several villages, namely Sapit, Aikmel, Lepak, Rensing, Sukarara Villages. Lofland and Lofland (Moleong, 1990) stated that the main data sources in qualitative research are words and actions and additional data such as documentation and others. In addition, data sources are informants, observable activities and documents. Informants according to (Matthew B. Miles; A. Michael Huberman 1994) can be divided into main actors and non-main actors, in this case the data sources for this study are:

1. Key informants, Regent and Deputy Regent of East Lombok, Winning Team/Chairman of the supporting political party, Regional Secretary. The next informants are the Village Head, Village Consultative Body (BPD), Chairperson of the Village Head Association, Chairperson of the BPD Association, Chairperson of the Village Apparatus Association.
2. Place and Event, namely the place of this research in the East Lombok district area, both in government offices, political party offices, village offices, and other locations.
3. Documents, as other data sources that complement the main data that are relevant to the problem and focus of the research, including: Documents of the report on the results of the 2008 and 2018 Regional Head and Deputy Regional Head Elections obtained from the East Lombok Regency General Election Commission.

Data analysis was carried out to find patterns, regarding the Pattern of Political Relations between the Regency and the Village including:

1. 1). The pattern of political relations between districts and villages with all its dynamics.
2. 2). What are the factors behind the pattern of political relations between districts and villages.
3. 3). What are the suggestions and recommendations from both the district and village levels, regarding the pattern of political relations that should be built after the implementation of the village law.

General Overview of the Research Context, West Nusa Tenggara Province (NTB) is astronomically located between $8^{\circ} 10' - 9^{\circ} 5'$ South Latitude and between $115^{\circ} 46' - 119^{\circ} 05'$ East Longitude. The area of NTB Province reaches 20,153.15 km². NTB Province consists of two large islands, namely Lombok Island and Sumbawa Island and hundreds of small islands. The center of government of NTB Province is in Mataram City, Lombok Island, which is also its capital. In the northern part of NTB Province there are the Java Sea and the Flores Sea, in the southern part there is the Indian Ocean, in the western part there is the Lombok Strait and Bali Province, while in the eastern part there is the Sape Strait and East Nusa Tenggara Province (NTT). The administrative area of East Lombok Regency consists of 21 sub-districts, 15 sub-districts, and 239 villages. As explained in the introduction of this study, the village government in East Lombok Regency has experienced rapid development where in 2013 there were 106 villages and in 2016 there were 239 villages.

III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Dynamics Of Village And Regency Political Power Relations

To explain the dynamics of power that occurred in East Lombok Regency, the author divides it into three periods: first, the 2008-2013 Period; second, the 2013-2018 Period; and the 2018-2023 Period. 2008-2013 Period 2008 was a historical year of democracy in the region to directly elect regional heads. The victory of the pair H. Muhammad Sukiman Azmi and H. M. Syamsul Lutfhi (SUFU) in the first direct regional head elections in 2008-2013, supported by political parties (Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the support of the Nahdhatul Wathan (NW) mass organization, the elected deputy regent candidate (Muh. Syamsul Lutfi) is the older brother of TGH. Muhammad Zainul Majdi who is often called TGB (Tuan Guru Bajang). TGB was the Governor of West Nusa Tenggara for two terms, namely 2008-2013 and 2013-2018. TGB is the youngest governor and from the Kiai community in NTB. The outstanding achievement in this first period was the expansion of villages and sub-districts in East Lombok Regency from 119 villages/sub-districts to 254 villages/sub-districts. The reason for the massive village expansion in East Lombok Regency was in order to welcome the changes to Law Number 32 of 2013. 2004, where one of the materials of the changes was that the central government would allocate funds to villages. The government's prediction at the time was correct that Law Number 32 of 2004 was wrong, the change was the ratification of Law Number 6 of 2014 concerning Villages, where one of the materials was that village income was budgeted through the APBN.

The policy of massive village expansion in all sub-districts in East Lombok from 106 villages to 239 villages. In the historical records of this regional regime, village expansion is an extraordinary achievement because politically it has a very significant impact on the increase in the number of villages and sub-districts and physical

progress towards village development. This achievement was even used as campaign material in the next regional election period by the incumbent Regent, but it turned out that the achievement was unable to win votes. The incumbent's defeat was not too far from his political rival, which was around 2.4%. Historically, village expansion in East Lombok was carried out from 2008 to 2013 during the first period of Sukiman Azmy's rule. Based on the results of an interview with Regent Sukiman Azmy (Regent of East Lombok for the 2008-2018 and 2018-2023 periods). He conveyed several things related to village expansion during his leadership that:

"The village expansion policy in East Lombok Regency began in 2008. Village expansion was actually intended to bring public services closer to the community. The idea of village expansion emerged as part of a response to the idea of forming a village law which was being worked on at that time, where the draft law on villages was a proposal from the parties in the DPR. One of the big ideas initiated by the draft village law was about how villages would be in the future. In addition to the responsive reasons above, village expansion in East Lombok Regency was also based on the experience gained from a working visit to Magelang and meeting with the Regent of Temanggung. Temanggung Regency has 300 villages with a population almost the same as East Lombok, and its area is also not the largest. Based on this information, together with the village head, he conducted a working visit to Temanggung to learn what and how to manage a village, there are so many tips. Based on the results of the work visit, then in early 2009, we began to expand our villages in East Lombok from 106 and the Regent targeted 300 villages, but only 239 villages. The target was not achieved because many East Lombok community leaders and villages objected to their villages being expanded, one example is Kota Raja Village so it only expanded into two and Dasan Lekong Village only expanded into (2) two villages. While other villages such as Sakra Village became 4 villages, Lendang Nangka Village 4 villages, then Rarang Village became 4 villages, other large villages in the Sikur area are expected to expand into 4 villages. From the expansion, there are spectacular ones, for example Keruak Village, where previously there was only one village called Selebung Ketangga, now there are 7 villages, imagine the extraordinary results. According to the Regent, there was a sense of disappointment when 2013 ended because East Lombok could have 239 villages and 15 sub-districts. For his achievements, Muhammad Sukiman Azmy was nicknamed the "Father of Village Expansion."

With the provision of facilities, so that the villages that were expanded out of the normative habit of one village one regulation, but what happened was one regulation for 88 villages. This condition forced the DPRD agenda to be really busy, where they made work visits here and there to conduct inspections and clarifications to the places of the villages that would be expanded. As emphasized by the Regent that:

"Indeed, we made it easier at that time, one example is that villages are required to provide land for the location of the prospective office as a requirement to expand the

village, a minimum of 12 ares of land. There are several villages that do not have land, then the local government buys it to be used with a loan or use rights status and if the village is able, it is bought by the village, in fact, instead of being bought, it is donated by the local government so that it belongs to the village until now. It was so easy for us to provide facilities for village expansion and it turned out that it was not optimally utilized by the old villages".

On the one hand, many villages as political entities complain about the dominance of state intervention through strict rules that must be followed, for example regarding the management of Village Fund Allocation (ADD). With this ADD, the district began to intervene a lot in the village, for example, the arrangement of very strict technical instructions, especially its allocation, because according to the technical instructions, the percentage of use for what has been determined, so that from the FGD conducted, on average, the village complained about the strict allocation of these funds, based on the conditions experienced by the village, they felt very dictated by the government above it. As stated by one of the representatives of Sapit Village and Rensing Bat Village, and Pematung Village, they said that: "the villages are dictated by the center with many rules issued, for example, the use of village fund allocations, all of their use has been set at a percentage, so that the village only allocates it and has no authority to regulate what it is for according to the needs of the village community."

Period 2013-2018. Sukiman Azmy's vote position was quite high, namely 255,387, only 17,339 different or around 2.81% from the winner, namely Moh. Ali Bin Dachlan and Khairul Warisin who came from individual candidates. The data shows that the target of village expansion carried out by Sukiman Azmy during his period of power was quite effective in gaining votes in the regional head election. The victory was determined after the recapitulation and open plenary meeting of the General Election Commission (KPU) of East Lombok Regency, Monday, May 20, 2013.

The facts found in the field were that the villages that were expanded were based on Law Number 32 of 2004, Government Regulation Number 72 of 2005 concerning Villages. During the first period of power, Sukiman Azmy took all village assets in the form of pecatu land to become regional assets because of the government policy to budget Siltap (fixed income) for village heads and staff budgeted through the Village Fund Allocation (ADD). The policy lasted until 2013.

In 2014 Law Number 6 of 2014 concerning Villages came into effect, Article 72 paragraph 5 states that "Village assets that have been taken over by the Regency/City Government are returned to the Village, except for those that have been used for public facilities." Based on the Law, it orders local governments that have taken/acquired assets to be returned. The return of village assets was carried out by the Regent for the 2013-2018 period, Moch. Ali Bin Dachlan, by issuing several Regent's Decrees, including:

- a. Decree of the Regent of East Lombok Number 188.45/319/PPKA/2014 concerning the Return of

Pecatu Lands Listed in the Balance Sheet of the East Lombok Regency Government to the Village Government

- b. Decree of the Regent of East Lombok Number 188.45/320/PPKA/2014 concerning Transfer in the Form of Pecatu Land Grants to the Village Government
- c. Decree of the Regent of East Lombok Number: 188.45/442/PPKA/2014 concerning the Removal of Pecatu Village Lands from the List of Regional

Property. With these three decisions, it provides legal certainty for villages to reclaim land taken by the region. The impact of the return is that all pecatu land is returned to the village of origin/parent because their customary law owns it. According to the opinion of the Regent of East Lombok for the 2013-2018 period, he explained that what was mandated by Law Number 6 of 2014 was correct because in reality pecatu land, customary land/benteng land are inseparable parts of the history of the birth of villages in Lombok and even villages in Indonesia in general. Regarding the village expansion policy, the Regent for the 2013-2018 period stated that: "Village expansion is a less than ideal choice because it has the impact of fragmentation/differentiation/division in the community as the basis for the formation of the village. According to him, based on the results of research conducted in 1976, villages on the island of Lombok/the entire island of Lombok totaling 270 villages, are original villages that have a long history, are alive and developing. This statement is certainly not without reason, the village's defense/self-defense from attacks by various interests is a strong reason, because expansion results in village strength being divided or not solid, the fact that happened in East Lombok Regency was that expansion actually gave rise to conflict within the village itself, one of which was the reluctance of the parent village to give their pecatu land to the village resulting from the expansion, there were even several hamlets who did not want to move to the new village because of the reason that kinship ties were still strong.

Period 2018-2023. In the 2018 Regional Election as per the data in table.6.3. It is very clear that support for Sukiman Azmy has not budged, remaining at 41.91% and is unbeatable. The initial capital is the issue of village expansion and the results are felt by the village with the budgeting of village funds by the central government becoming a free campaign for Sukiman Azmy.

This third period is the peak of Sukiman Azmy's power in East Lombok Regency because in this second period, big dreams to empower villages resulting from expansion during the 2008-2013 (first) period of power. On the one hand, the dream of empowerment that he wants to implement is somewhat different from the latest village law. There are several policy issues related to the power relations built between the village head and the regent during this period, which have been confirmed by various parties or

informants, both from the village, district, experts and community groups, including:

Campaign promise of one village one field

The phenomenon of open land in the village has become a rare commodity, even what has emerged are paid public places such as futsal fields, badminton sports halls, and others. The problem is where the open land comes from, does the local government have assets in all the villages in the 239 villages, for example if the need per village and sub-district is one hectare, then a minimum of 239 hectares of land is needed. Based on the results of interviews with the Regent of East Lombok for the 2008-2013 and 2018-2023 periods that "starting from the regent at the time of village expansion, he was given convenience in meeting the requirements, one of which was the preparation of the location of the village office for the expansion. Especially for the expansion villages that do not yet have a village office location, the regent gave it a loan for use, even the location was purchased and its use was on loan for use by the village. However, in the end the land was given by the local government as a village asset." Furthermore, the Acting Regent who was previously the Regional Secretary of East Lombok Regency also admitted that: "Recently, the local government has given many grants to villages, such as fields that were previously managed by the district because they were considered more effective to be managed by the village and handed over through a grant mechanism. Then another example is that the village's Pecatu land is used for the construction of a health center, because the village government is not allowed to grant it to the region, and the regional government is not allowed to take Pecatu village land carelessly, so it is done through a replacement purchase mechanism and/or through an exchange mechanism."

Based on this claim, it became the reason why the regent in the second period made a political promise of one village, one field. Based on the results of the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) with the village government, regional government, and experts in the field of government, it was found that confirmation results were found that "the village does not need fields yet, what is needed more is employment opportunities such as course institutions. Meanwhile, the village's treasury land is very much needed by the village as an additional source of village income."

Termination of Village Apparatus Allowances

Based on the Decree (SK) of the Regent of East Lombok Regency No: 188.45/718/PMD/2019 Concerning the Determination of Fixed Income Allowances, Village Fund Allocation (ADD) and Regional Tax and Regional Retribution Sharing for 2020 in East Lombok Regency. The decision received a reaction from village officials through PPDI (Indonesian Village Apparatus Association) because it eliminated village apparatus allowances on the grounds that village apparatus salaries were in accordance with the Regency Minimum Wage (UMK) so that the allowances

were removed, namely IDR 400,000 to IDR 450,000/month. Based on the results of the interview, the Head of the Village Government Empowerment Service of East Lombok Regency stated that another reason was the increasing number of village officials who needed to be paid due to the expansion of villages and hamlets so that it greatly affected the APBD, for village apparatus allowances it required a budget of around IDR 15 billion/year. The policy received a strong reaction (resistance) from village officials through the association they formed, namely PPDI (Indonesian Village Apparatus Association). Their reaction was to oppose the regent's policy because it had reduced the income of village officials which had an impact on welfare.

Provision of Financial Assistance to Bumdes

One of the breakthroughs in the regulations in Law Number 6 of 2016 is regarding Village-Owned Enterprises (BUMDes). BUMDes is intended for how economic potentials in the village can be facilitated and directed by the BUMDes economic institution which is managed professionally which will ultimately contribute to the Village's Original Income itself and the hope is that it can increase the village's economic independence to manage operational funds. According to government regulation PP Number 11 of 2021 concerning Village-Owned Enterprises Article 47:

1. BUM Desa/Joint BUM Desa can receive assistance from the Central Government, Regional Government, and/or other parties that are not binding.
2. The assistance as referred to in paragraph (1) becomes an Asset of BUM Desa/Joint BUM Desa.
3. Assistance from the Central Government and Regional Government as referred to in paragraph (1) is channeled directly to the Village BUM/Joint Village BUM and implemented in accordance with the provisions of laws and regulations.

(4) Assistance from other parties as referred to in paragraph (1) is channeled directly to the Village BUM/Joint Village BUM and implemented at any time in accordance with the agreement of the parties with the Village BUM/Joint Village BUM.

The provision of assistance to BUMDes in East Lombok Regency as reported in the mass media quoted from [46] that the provision of capital assistance to BUMDes in order to encourage BUMDes to be active in distributing the Non-Cash Assistance Program (PBNT) to the community in the form of basic necessities of a predetermined type and quantity [47]. Another problem is that out of 329 villages, only 20 villages were given assistance, thus causing jealousy from the other 309 villages [48]. The twenty villages are BUMDes Suela, Masbagik Utara Baru, Setanggor, Kembang Kuning, Suela, Gunung Rajak, Sugian, Labuhan Lombok, and Pringgasela. Then Pasenggrahan, Wanasaba Lauk, Presak, Pandan Wangi, Korleko, Senyur, South Kelayu, Surabaya, Slagek, Dasan Borok, and Sajang [49].

2. Reconstruction Of Village And District Power Relations

Based on the theory of democracy, villages have a very strong democratic foundation known as grassroots democracy. Grassroots democracy has specific characteristics according to the character of the local community and has a very strong binding force on the work of leadership at the local level (charismatic leadership). Grassroots democracy [50] is also a political ideology that emphasizes broad participation of the community in decision-making and management of the political system. The interests of the local community are the main focus of the work of this democracy.

Development planning at the village level is carried out independently, both in the form of programs and budgeting. Musrenbangdes (Village Development Planning Deliberation) is a democratic media in the village to determine programs according to real conditions and the needs of the community. Often Musrenbangdes is only a formality to justify that Development Planning is carried out from below (bottom up). In reality, the results of the Musrenbangdes must be subject to decisions above because they are considered not in accordance with regional/national priorities.

Reconstruction based on the theory of power relations, according to this theory that power is everywhere and comes from everywhere. This means that power belongs to everyone, all groups so that the conclusion is that power does not only belong to a particular power structure. The context of power, at all levels of government structures have power, what distinguishes it is the reach of the power itself. For example, the power structure of the central government, regional government, and villages is limited by the reach of its power, but the main principle is that at each level they have the same power.

In a power structure based on the concept of democracy, the existing levels of power do not always make them dominate each other, but rather strengthen each other at all levels of power. From this explanation, the power relation according to Foucault is power as a mutually reinforcing strategy. The power relations of dominance that have occurred between villages and districts in East Lombok Regency should be changed into power relations that strengthen each other or partners/partnerships by respecting each other's duties and functions, the uniqueness of each, not negating each other. Reconstruction based on local political theory, local politics is based on the concept of blood autonomy. Regional autonomy is the right, authority, and obligation of autonomous regions to regulate and manage their own government affairs and the interests of the local community in the system of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. To strengthen the explanation of the reconstruction of power relations in detail how the relationship between the village and the district. This is to provide an explanation of how the village positions itself and how the village government above treats the village as a strategic partner for development.

IV. CONCLUSION

This study concludes as follows: 1. The dynamics of the power relations between the village and the district, there

are three relations that occur, namely the power relations of dominance, the power relations of interdependence, and the power relations influenced by the leadership style of the regional head or regent. The power relations of dominance are very clear when the village is faced with the district, where the village is in a position to accept what the district decides regarding various regulations from the central, provincial, and district governments. The interdependent relationship is seen on the one hand, the village has original village autonomy while on the other hand it is faced with regional autonomy. These two positions are ambiguous, both of which interpret autonomy in their respective perspectives. This ambiguity has an impact on the confusion of the relationship built between the village and the supra village. The district is above and has power over the village so that with the authority it has, it makes various policies where the village is the final outlet in its implementation. 2. Construction of the concept of village and district power relations by not enjoying/eliminating the original autonomy of the village. Associations in the form of NGOs, associations according to the profession of village government such as the Village Head Communication Forum (FKKD), BPD Communication Forum, Village Apparatus Communication Forum (FKPD), and at the national level there is the Association of Indonesian Village Governments (APDESI). Associations that emerge at the village level, especially in East Lombok Regency, are quite colorful, especially in fighting for the aspirations of the village government.

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