

SEEING IS BELIEVING: SERVICE TRANSPARENCY AS A KEY TO ACCOUNTABLE VILLAGE GOVERNANCE

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to investigate the impact of transparency and community participation on perceived accountability in village governance. Using a quantitative approach, data were collected from 46 respondents in Sleman Regency, Indonesia, through a structured questionnaire. The sample was selected using a combination of simple random and stratified sampling methods. The research utilized Structural Equation Modeling–Partial Least Squares (SEM-PLS) for data analysis. The findings reveal that service transparency significantly enhances perceived accountability, while financial transparency has no significant impact. Additionally, trust and participation were found to influence transparency preferences, but they did not mediate the relationship between transparency and accountability. These results highlight the importance of service-oriented transparency in improving governance accountability, suggesting that governments should prioritize visible outcomes over complex financial disclosures. This research contributes to the understanding of citizen-driven governance and offers practical insights for improving local accountability through enhanced service transparency.

ABSTRAK

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis pengaruh transparansi layanan dan transparansi keuangan terhadap akuntabilitas pemerintahan desa dengan memperhatikan peran kepercayaan dan partisipasi masyarakat sebagai mediator. Penelitian menggunakan pendekatan kuantitatif dengan survei terhadap 46 responden di Kabupaten Sleman, Indonesia. Sampel ditentukan melalui pengambilan sampel acak sederhana dan stratifikasi. Data dianalisis menggunakan Structural Equation Modeling–Partial Least Squares (SEM-PLS). Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa transparansi layanan berpengaruh signifikan terhadap akuntabilitas, sementara transparansi keuangan tidak menunjukkan pengaruh yang signifikan. Selain itu, meskipun kepercayaan dan partisipasi masyarakat memengaruhi preferensi transparansi, keduanya tidak berperan sebagai mediator dalam hubungan transparansi dan akuntabilitas. Temuan ini menggarisbawahi pentingnya transparansi yang berfokus pada layanan dalam meningkatkan akuntabilitas pemerintahan desa. Implikasi praktis penelitian ini adalah perlunya fokus pada transparansi yang lebih nyata dan terukur dalam pelayanan publik untuk memperbaiki akuntabilitas di tingkat lokal.

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INTRODUCTION

Transparency and accountability are fundamental pillars of good governance, especially in decentralized systems like Indonesia's village administration. Village governments are responsible for managing public resources, delivering services, and ensuring community welfare. The effectiveness of these governments is heavily influenced by how transparent their operations are and how accountable they are to the local population. In decentralized systems, where governance is often more localized, citizens are directly affected by the decisions of village officials, making transparency and accountability even more crucial. Transparency, in this context, is not just about the openness of government activities; it is a process through which citizens can assess the behavior of their leaders, ensuring that power is used responsibly (Heald, 2018; Basri et al., 2021; Widanti, 2022). This citizen-oriented view is also consistent with stakeholder-based governance, which emphasizes the obligation of public institutions to respond to the interests of the communities they serve (Freeman, 1984).

Recent scholarship has highlighted the complex relationship between transparency and accountability, noting that transparency in both financial and service-related aspects plays a crucial role in shaping the public's trust in government (Raaphorst & Van De Walle, 2018; Sofyani et al., 2022a). A growing body of evidence further shows that openness can strengthen trust when information is understandable, timely, and relevant to citizens' experiences (Alessandro et al., 2021; Beshi & Kaur, 2020; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). At the same time, trust can deteriorate when accountability arrangements are perceived as symbolic or ineffective, particularly under conditions of public pressure (Bouckaert & Van de Walle, 2001; Broadbent, 2020). However, despite the growing recognition of transparency as a key factor in promoting good governance, many studies have treated it as a static output rather than an evolving process that responds to the changing needs and preferences of citizens (Sihotang et al., 2025). This gap in the literature has prompted the exploration of community preferences—specifically citizens' inclinations towards openness and participation—as a dynamic force that influences the effectiveness of governance systems (Sofyani et al., 2020; Kasmiah et al., 2024). This perspective is aligned with broader transparency scholarship that views public information as meaningful only when it can actually be used by citizens to evaluate government behavior (Matheus & Janssen, 2020).

In governance, transparency is typically divided into two main categories: financial transparency and service transparency. Financial transparency involves the disclosure of government spending, budgeting processes, and resource allocation, which can often be complex and difficult for the average citizen to understand (Sofyani et al., 2021; Nurriksziana et al., 2017). Service transparency, on the other hand, is concerned with the visible outcomes of government actions, such as the quality and availability of public services, which are more easily understood by citizens (Damayanti & Syarifuddin, 2020; Sa'adah & Syadeli, 2021). The distinction between these two forms of transparency is critical, as studies have suggested that service transparency may have a more immediate and tangible impact on citizens' trust and satisfaction with their local governments compared to financial transparency (Pratolo et al., 2022; Sofyani et al., 2022a). Recent studies on village information systems, integrated service applications, digital governance, and village-fund disclosure likewise indicate that transparency becomes more meaningful when it is translated into accessible service interfaces and observable service performance (Rizal et al., 2023; Rizal & Siskawati, 2022; Wibowo et al., 2022; Zulmasyhur et al., 2024; Kurnia et al., 2025; Siraj et al., 2022). Understanding the difference in how these two types of transparency are perceived by the public is key to addressing governance issues at the local level.

Community preferences, particularly in terms of what they prioritize in governance transparency, have often been overlooked in traditional governance models. However, recent studies have argued that the effectiveness of transparency mechanisms is shaped not only by institutional frameworks but also by the preferences of the people they serve (Pratolo et al., 2022). These preferences refer to citizens'

expectations regarding the types of information they find most relevant and the level of participation they desire in governance processes (Sofyani et al., 2022a). Preference formation itself has been widely discussed in behavioral and public-choice studies, showing that citizens tend to respond more strongly to information that is immediately useful, familiar, and connected to everyday decisions (Putra, 2017; Putri, 2023; Susanti, 2023; Waluyo et al., 2023). For instance, while some citizens may prioritize the transparency of financial matters, others may place greater importance on visible and measurable improvements in public services. This variation in preferences suggests that a one-size-fits-all approach to transparency may not be effective in fostering trust and accountability in local governments.

Trust is another critical component in this relationship. Transparency is often seen as a precursor to building trust in government, as it provides citizens with the information, they need to assess the actions of their leaders (Raaphorst & Van De Walle, 2018; Heald, 2018). Prior research has consistently shown that accountability and transparency mechanisms can strengthen public trust when they are accompanied by credible implementation and understandable communication (Fard & Rostamy, 2007; Aprilia, 2019; Arum et al., 2024; Suhardi et al., 2023). However, trust alone may not be sufficient to improve perceptions of accountability unless it is coupled with visible, responsive actions from the government. For example, a government may be highly transparent about its financial activities but fail to provide quality public services, leading citizens to question the legitimacy of their leaders despite the availability of financial data (Husni et al., 2023). In contrast, governments that demonstrate responsiveness and deliver tangible services may enhance their credibility even if they are less transparent in financial matters; perceptions of integrity and corruption also shape how that transparency is interpreted by citizens (Sofyani et al., 2022b).

Public participation is another key factor that interacts with transparency to shape perceptions of accountability. In many decentralized systems, participatory governance mechanisms allow citizens to influence decision-making processes and hold government officials accountable for their actions (Damayanti & Syarifuddin, 2020). While transparency provides the necessary information for citizens to monitor government performance, participation empowers them to actively engage in the governance process. Together, these two factors create a feedback loop that strengthens accountability, as governments are more likely to respond to the needs and concerns of citizens who are informed and involved in decision-making processes (Hamsinar, 2022; Tran dan La, 2022). This participatory logic is especially relevant in village fund governance and anti-corruption oversight, where community involvement can function as a direct mechanism of social control (Zakariya, 2020).




Figure 1. Comparison between Conventional Approaches and the Present Study's Perspective

Figure 1 presents a comparison between conventional approaches and the perspective of this study, where community preferences actively drive accountability, rather than merely responding to formal structures. This figure highlights the central role of citizens' preferences for service transparency in fostering local accountability, a focus that distinguishes this study from traditional governance models.

Preliminary findings suggest that community preferences for service transparency have a more significant impact on perceptions of accountability than preferences for financial transparency. In rural and decentralized contexts like village governance in Indonesia, citizens are more likely to prioritize transparency related to service delivery—such as improvements in healthcare, education, and infrastructure—over complex financial disclosures (Pratolo et al., 2022; Sofyani et al., 2022a). This finding suggests that citizens are more concerned with the visible and immediate outcomes of government actions rather than the intricate details of financial management. Understanding this shift in priorities is essential for designing governance systems that are responsive to the needs of the people.

This study aims to examine how community preferences for financial transparency and service transparency shape perceived accountability in village governance, together with the roles of trust in village government and community participation. By differentiating between the two dimensions of transparency, this research contributes to the literature on citizen-driven accountability in decentralized governance. The hypotheses derived from this framework are presented in the following section.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

The study of transparency and accountability has evolved significantly in the context of governance, especially in decentralized systems like Indonesia's village administration. Village governments are tasked with managing public resources and services, which directly affect local communities. As these governments are more directly accountable to their citizens in decentralized systems, the importance of transparency and accountability in shaping governance outcomes becomes critical. Transparency is a key factor in ensuring that citizens are aware of governmental decisions and how resources are allocated, while accountability refers to the obligation of public officials to justify their actions to the public. Together, these concepts ensure that local governments remain responsive and responsible to their citizens. Conceptually, this argument is rooted in stakeholder and disclosure traditions that connect

organizational responsibility, information openness, and managerial performance to public evaluation (Freeman, 1984; Gray et al., 1995; Mahoney et al., 1965; Hansen & Mowen, 2009).

Transparency in governance takes two main forms: financial transparency and service transparency. Financial transparency involves the disclosure of government expenditures, budgeting processes, and resource allocations. It is vital in allowing citizens to track how public funds are being spent, thereby ensuring the efficient use of resources and preventing corruption (Sofyani et al., 2021; Pasaribu et al., 2023; Setiawan & Yusoff, 2025). However, financial transparency can be complex and difficult for many citizens to understand, particularly in rural areas, where access to detailed financial data may be limited. In contrast, service transparency is focused on the visible and tangible outcomes of governance, such as the quality and availability of public services, infrastructure, education, and healthcare. Service transparency is often more accessible and relevant to citizens, particularly in rural and decentralized settings where citizens are more concerned with the immediate and observable benefits of government actions (Sofyani et al., 2022; Hermansyah et al., 2018). In these contexts, service transparency tends to be more impactful than financial transparency because citizens can directly experience the improvements in public services that result from transparent governance. This pattern is also echoed in recent village-fund studies linking transparency, accountability, and governance quality at the local level (Puspitasari et al., 2023; Setyaningrum et al., 2024; Mais et al., 2024).

Accountability in governance refers to the responsibility of public officials to answer for their actions and decisions. It ensures that government actions align with the public's interests and that citizens can hold their leaders responsible for decisions that affect their lives (Raaphorst & Van De Walle, 2018). Financial transparency contributes to accountability by allowing citizens to track how resources are being used, while service transparency directly influences perceptions of accountability because it is linked to visible, tangible improvements in citizens' daily lives. Studies have shown that when citizens perceive that their government is transparent and responsive, they are more likely to view it as accountable (Darmawati et al., 2019; Purnamasari, 2021; Wulandari, 2021). However, as Heald (2018) argues, transparency alone does not guarantee accountability unless it is accompanied by visible outcomes in terms of service delivery. This is particularly important in decentralized systems, where citizens are more directly impacted by the decisions of local governments.

Trust in government is another crucial factor that links transparency and accountability. Trust is enhanced when transparency provides citizens with the information they need to assess the integrity and effectiveness of their government. Raaphorst & Van De Walle (2018) explain that transparency fosters trust by enabling citizens to judge the performance of their leaders. Trust, in turn, can strengthen citizens' perceptions of accountability, as they are more likely to believe that their leaders will act in their best interests if they trust the information being provided. Empirical studies in village and regional governance likewise report that financial accountability, performance accountability, and transparency can improve public trust, although the strength of this relationship varies across contexts (Nurritziana et al., 2017; Susliyanti & Binawati, 2020; Sofyani & Tahar, 2021). However, trust alone may not be sufficient to ensure accountability. As noted by Heald (2018), trust must be supported by tangible results in public service delivery to effectively influence citizens' perceptions of government accountability.

Public participation is also a key element that shapes the relationship between transparency and accountability. Participation allows citizens to engage with governance processes, voice their concerns, and influence decision-making. Damayanti & Syarifuddin (2020) argue that participatory governance mechanisms enable citizens to actively monitor and hold government officials accountable. Transparency, by providing citizens with the information needed to assess government performance, directly influences the level of public participation. When citizens are informed about government activities, they are more likely to engage in decision-making processes, which in turn strengthens accountability. As Sofyani et al.

(2022a) suggest, the interaction between transparency and participation creates a feedback loop that enhances government accountability. The more transparent a government is, the more likely citizens are to participate in governance, and the more participatory a governance system is, the more accountable it becomes. Similar associations have been documented in recent village governance studies emphasizing participation, transparency, and accountability in fund management and local decision-making (Lihawa et al., 2025; Setyaningrum et al., 2024; Sabirin, 2025).

The concept of community preferences is central to understanding how transparency and participation are perceived by citizens. Different communities may prioritize different aspects of transparency based on their unique needs and expectations. For example, while some communities may place greater emphasis on financial transparency to ensure the responsible use of public funds, others may prioritize service transparency, focusing on the visible outcomes of governance such as infrastructure improvements and access to healthcare (Sofyani et al., 2022a). As Pratolo et al. (2022) explain, service transparency is particularly important in rural and decentralized contexts, where citizens are more concerned with the direct impact of government actions on their daily lives. The village context of Sleman is also relevant because prior studies in the same regency have shown that local autonomy and governance capacity shape how communities evaluate village administration (Pratolo et al., 2020). In operational terms, indicators of accountability, transparency, and participation also need to be translated into forms that are understandable to local communities (Krina & Lalolo, 2003). Understanding the role of community preferences in shaping transparency mechanisms is essential for designing effective governance systems that respond to the specific needs of local populations.

Figure 2 presents the conceptual framework of this study, illustrating the relationships between transparency, community preferences, trust, participation, and accountability. The figure highlights the central role of service transparency in driving perceptions of accountability, particularly in decentralized governance systems. While financial transparency plays a role, it is expected to have a weaker influence on accountability perceptions compared to service transparency, which is more directly relevant to citizens' experiences. Based on the theoretical framework outlined above, this study proposes eight hypotheses concerning the effects of financial transparency and service transparency on trust, participation, and perceived accountability in village governance.




Figure 2. Conceptual Framework

Financial transparency enables citizens to observe how public funds are allocated and used by village government. When financial information is disclosed clearly, it can strengthen public confidence, encourage civic involvement, and support perceptions that village administration is conducted responsibly (Aprilia, 2019; Nurriszkiana et al., 2017; Purnamasari et al., 2022; Puspitasari et al., 2023).

H1a: Financial transparency positively influences trust in village government.

H1b: Financial transparency positively influences community participation.

H1c: Financial transparency positively influences perceived accountability.

Service transparency concerns the openness of service processes and outcomes that citizens can directly observe in their daily interactions with village government. Because service delivery is more visible and easier to evaluate than technical financial information, service transparency is expected to strengthen trust, participation, and accountability perceptions more directly (Hermansyah et al., 2018; Pratolo et al., 2022; Rizal et al., 2023; Kurnia et al., 2025).

H2a: Service transparency positively influences trust in village government.

H2b: Service transparency positively influences community participation.

H2c: Service transparency positively influences perceived accountability.

Trust in village government and community participation are two civic responses that can shape how citizens evaluate governance performance. When citizens trust the village administration and actively participate in governance processes, they are more likely to perceive that the government acts responsibly and accountably (Arum et al., 2024; Lihawa et al., 2025; Setyaningrum et al., 2024).

H3a: Trust in village government positively influences perceived accountability.

H3b: Community participation positively influences perceived accountability.

RESEARCH METHOD

This study employed a quantitative research design using a survey-based approach to examine the relationships among community preferences for transparency, trust in village government, community participation, and perceived accountability. The research was conducted in Sleman Regency, Indonesia, involving residents from selected villages as the unit of analysis. The population consisted of community members who interacted with village administrative services. A total of 46 respondents were selected through a combination of simple random sampling and stratified sampling, ensuring proportional representation across village demographic segments. The sample size followed the adequacy rule of SEM-PLS and aligned with the minimum sample recommendations of Krejcie & Morgan (1970). The contextual choice of Sleman is also supported by prior village-governance research in the same regency (Pratolo et al., 2020).

Data were collected through a structured questionnaire distributed directly to respondents. Each variable was measured using multiple indicators assessed on a five-point Likert scale. The study involved five latent constructs: Service Transparency (ST), Financial Transparency (FT), Trust in Village Government (TRUST), Community Participation (PART), and Perceived Accountability (ACC). All constructs used reflective indicators consistent with the empirical structure of the instrument. The operationalization of accountability, transparency, and participation indicators was informed by prior governance measurement work (Krina & Lalolo, 2003). The measurement (outer) model for reflective indicators is expressed as:

$$x_{ij} = \lambda_{ij} \xi_j + \delta_{ij}$$

where x_{ij} represents indicator i of latent construct j , λ_{ij} is the loading coefficient, ξ_j is the latent variable, and δ_{ij} is the measurement error. Accordingly, the reflective model for each construct can be represented as:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{x}_{ST} &= \begin{bmatrix} ST_1 \\ ST_2 \\ ST_3 \\ ST_4 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_{ST_1} \\ \lambda_{ST_2} \\ \lambda_{ST_3} \\ \lambda_{ST_4} \end{bmatrix} ST. + \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{ST_1} \\ \varepsilon_{ST_2} \\ \varepsilon_{ST_3} \\ \varepsilon_{ST_4} \end{bmatrix} \\ \mathbf{x}_{FT} &= \begin{bmatrix} FT_1 \\ FT_2 \\ FT_3 \\ FT_4 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_{FT_1} \\ \lambda_{FT_2} \\ \lambda_{FT_3} \\ \lambda_{FT_4} \end{bmatrix} FT + \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{FT_1} \\ \varepsilon_{FT_2} \\ \varepsilon_{FT_3} \\ \varepsilon_{FT_4} \end{bmatrix} \\ \mathbf{x}_{TRUST} &= \begin{bmatrix} TR_1 \\ TR_2 \\ TR_3 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_{TR_1} \\ \lambda_{TR_2} \\ \lambda_{TR_3} \end{bmatrix} TRUST + \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{TR_1} \\ \varepsilon_{TR_2} \\ \varepsilon_{TR_3} \end{bmatrix} \\ \mathbf{x}_{PART} &= \begin{bmatrix} PA_1 \\ PA_2 \\ PA_3 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_{PA_1} \\ \lambda_{PA_2} \\ \lambda_{PA_3} \end{bmatrix} PART. + \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{PA_1} \\ \varepsilon_{PA_2} \\ \varepsilon_{PA_3} \end{bmatrix} \\ \mathbf{x}_{ACC} &= \begin{bmatrix} AC_1 \\ AC_2 \\ AC_3 \\ AC_4 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_{AC_1} \\ \lambda_{AC_2} \\ \lambda_{AC_3} \\ \lambda_{AC_4} \end{bmatrix} ACC. + \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{AC_1} \\ \varepsilon_{AC_2} \\ \varepsilon_{AC_3} \\ \varepsilon_{AC_4} \end{bmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

All indicators were tested for reliability and validity using Cronbach's Alpha, Composite Reliability (CR), and Average Variance Extracted (AVE). Discriminant validity was assessed using the Fornell–Larcker criterion and cross-loadings (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The structural (inner) model represents the causal relationships among the latent constructs, following the hypothesis structure. The use of PLS-SEM is appropriate for prediction-oriented analysis and complex latent-variable modeling in accounting and governance research (Lee et al., 2011; Hair et al., 2013; Hair et al., 2017). The general SEM-PLS structural equation is:

$$\eta = B\eta + \Gamma\xi + \zeta$$

For this study, the inner model can be expanded into the following system of equations:

$$TRUST = \beta_1 ST + \beta_2 FT + \zeta_1$$

$$PART = \beta_3 ST + \beta_4 FT + \zeta_2$$

$$ACC = \beta_5 ST + \beta_6 FT + \beta_7 TRUST + \beta_8 PART + \zeta_3$$

To compute the significance of structural paths, the bootstrapped t-statistics were calculated using:

$$t = \frac{\hat{\beta}}{SE(\hat{\beta})}$$

where $\hat{\beta}$ is the estimated path coefficient and $SE(\hat{\beta})$ is the standard error obtained from 5,000 bootstrap subsamples. The explanatory power of the model was evaluated using the coefficient of determination:

$$R^2_{TRUST} = \beta_1 ST + \beta_2 FT$$

$$R^2_{PART} = \beta_3 ST + \beta_4 FT$$

$$R^2_ACC = \beta_5 ST + \beta_6 FT + \beta_7 TRUST + \beta_8 PART$$

Model fit indices including RMSEA, SRMR, CFI, and TLI were generated using the PLS algorithm in R Studio. The values obtained (RMSEA = 0,048; SRMR = 0,044; CFI = 0,960; TLI = 0,926) confirmed a good fit and supported the use of the model for hypothesis testing. Overall, the analytical procedures in this study provide a comprehensive quantitative assessment of the relationships between community transparency preferences, trust, participation, and accountability within village governance.

RESULT AND DISCUSSIONS

The analysis of research results begins with the evaluation of the measurement model, followed by an assessment of the structural model and hypothesis testing, ensuring that the findings remain aligned with the PLS-SEM procedures implemented in R Studio. Overall, the empirical results reflect strong reliability, validity, and a robust structural fit, enabling meaningful interpretation of the relationships among service transparency, financial transparency, trust, participation, and accountability within the context of village governance. Descriptive findings show that respondents hold generally positive perceptions of the constructs measured in this study. As summarized in Table 1, the mean scores for all constructs range from 3.92 to 4.11, demonstrating consistent agreement among participants regarding transparency, trustworthiness, civic engagement, and accountability within village administrative processes. The standard deviations below 0,55 indicate low variability across responses, suggesting that perceptions are relatively homogeneous. Reliability metrics further support the internal consistency of all constructs, with Cronbach's Alpha values surpassing 0,78 and Composite Reliability values exceeding 0,85 for each latent variable. Convergent validity is also confirmed, as indicated by Average Variance Extracted (AVE) values above the 0,50 threshold for each construct, including Service Transparency (0,633), Financial Transparency (0,612), Trust (0,648), Participation (0,619), and Accountability (0,676), demonstrating that each construct explains more than half of the variance of its observed indicators.

The Fornell–Larcker discriminant validity results, presented in Table 2, reveal that all constructs possess adequate discriminant properties. The square root of AVE for each construct, positioned along the diagonal, is larger than its correlations with other constructs. This indicates that each latent variable is empirically distinct and captures unique variance within the dataset. These findings confirm that the measurement properties of the model are statistically sound, laying the foundation for a rigorous evaluation of the structural model.

After validating the measurement model, the structural model was assessed to examine the hypothesized causal relationships among variables. The global model fit indices obtained from R Studio confirm a strong overall fit. As shown in Table 3, the RMSEA value of 0,048 remains below the recommended threshold of 0,06, indicating that the model corresponds closely with the observed covariance structure. The SRMR value of 0,044 further indicates minimal residuals, signaling highly accurate predictions between the observed and estimated matrices. The CFI (0,960) and TLI (0,926) both exceed the commonly accepted criterion of 0,90, confirming that the model demonstrates robust explanatory power and structural adequacy.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Reliability of Constructs

Construct	Number of Items	Mean	Std. Dev.	Cronbach's Alpha	Composite Reliability	AVE
Service Transparency	4	4,11	0,43	0,812	0,873	0,633
Financial Transparency	4	3,97	0,51	0,796	0,858	0,612
Trust in Village Gov.	3	4,05	0,47	0,823	0,881	0,648
Community Participation	3	3,92	0,49	0,811	0,867	0,619
Accountability	4	4,08	0,44	0,843	0,892	0,676
Service Preference	4	4,11	0,43	0,812	0,873	0,633

Source: Data Processed using R Studio (2025)

Table 2. Discriminant Validity (Fornell–Larcker Criterion)


Construct	ST	FT	TRUST	PART.	ACC
Service Transparency (ST)	0,796				
Financial Transparency (FT)	0,524	0,782			
Trust in Village Gov.	0,604	0,438	0,805		
Community Participation	0,589	0,426	0,566	0,787	
Accountability	0,728	0,511	0,607	0,594	0,822

Source : Data Processed using R Studio (2025)

Table 3. Structural Model Fit Summary

Fit Index	Value	Threshold	Evaluation
RMSEA	0,048	< 0,06	Good
SRMR	0,044	< 0,08	Good
CFI	0,960	> 0,90	Excellent
TLI	0,926	> 0,90	Excellent

Source : Data Processed using R Studio (2025)

**Figure 3. Empirical Structural Model Output (SEM-PLS)**

The PLS-SEM structural output is visually summarized in Figure 3, illustrating the magnitude and direction of the relationships among constructs. The figure clearly displays a stronger network of statistically significant relationships originating from service transparency, in comparison to financial transparency. The path from service transparency to accountability is notably strong, whereas relationships involving financial transparency appear weak and statistically insignificant. This visual representation aligns with the numerical results of the hypothesis testing that follows.

The hypothesis testing results further clarify these relationships. As shown in Table 4, community preference for service transparency displays a strong and statistically significant effect on perceived accountability, with a path coefficient of $\beta = 0,729$ and a t-value of 6,394 ($p < 0,001$). This indicates that when citizens perceive village services to be transparent—meaning they can access, observe, and understand service delivery processes—they are substantially more likely to evaluate the village government as accountable. Service transparency also significantly influences trust in village government ($\beta = 0,293$, $p = 0,035$) and community participation ($\beta = 0,279$, $p = 0,041$). These findings suggest that transparency in service processes not only fosters institutional trust but also encourages citizens to engage more actively in governance activities. Both trust and participation, however, fail to significantly predict accountability. The path from trust to accountability is weak ($\beta = 0,044$; $p = 0,616$), and the path from participation to accountability is similarly insignificant and negative ($\beta = -0,094$; $p = 0,494$), indicating that neither construct functions as a mediator between transparency and accountability.

Table 4. Hypothesis Testing Results Based on SEM-PLS

Hypothesis	Relationship	β	t-value	p-value	Result
H1a	Financial Transparency → Trust	0,255	1,697	0,091	Not Supported
H1b	Financial Transparency → Participation	0,167	1,205	0,229	Not Supported
H1c	Financial Transparency → Accountability	0,194	1,366	0,173	Not Supported
H2a	Service Transparency → Trust	0,293	2,116	0,035	Supported
H2b	Service Transparency → Participation	0,279	2,050	0,041	Supported
H2c	Service Transparency → Accountability	0,729	6,394	0,000	Supported
H3a	Trust → Accountability	0,044	0,502	0,616	Not Supported
H3b	Participation → Accountability	-0,094	0,685	0,494	Not Supported

Source: Data Processed using R Studio (2025)




Figure 4. Correlation Heatmap among Constructs

In contrast, all pathways originating from financial transparency are statistically insignificant. Financial transparency does not significantly affect trust ($p = 0.091$), participation ($p = 0.229$), or accountability ($p = 0.173$). These findings reveal that while financial disclosure is present in village governance, it does not serve as a primary determinant of governance perceptions. The technical nature of budget documents, financial statements, and expenditure reports may limit citizens' ability to interpret their meaning, reducing their practical impact.

The correlation heatmap presented in Figure 4 reinforces these numerical results visually. Service transparency exhibits the highest correlation with accountability ($r = 0.73$), indicating a strong relationship between observable service outcomes and perceived government responsibility. It also demonstrates moderate correlations with trust ($r = 0.60$) and participation ($r = 0.58$). Meanwhile, financial transparency shows considerably weaker correlations across all variables, confirming its limited influence within the perception structure of village governance.

Synthesizing these findings, it becomes evident that accountability in village governance is shaped most strongly by the tangible and visible aspects of public service delivery. Citizens appear to judge the performance and responsibility of local government based on what they directly experience rather than on technical administrative documents. This insight aligns with the structural findings, where service transparency—not financial transparency—drives accountability perceptions. Trust and participation, although positively shaped by service transparency, do not function as intermediary mechanisms toward accountability, suggesting that the public evaluates accountability more directly through observable service-level outcomes.

These results contribute several theoretical insights. First, they suggest that decentralization in governance amplifies the significance of service performance, as citizens interact more frequently and directly with village-level policies and administration. Accountability becomes a reflection of experiential governance rather than procedural compliance. Second, the weak influence of financial transparency demonstrates that formal disclosure, while essential for administrative standards, may not translate into meaningful public oversight without efforts to simplify and humanize financial information. Finally, the absence of mediating effects indicates that accountability is not a derivative perception shaped by attitudes (trust) or engagement (participation), but a primary evaluative judgment grounded in tangible experience.

From a practical standpoint, the results highlight the need for village governments to prioritize transparency initiatives that foreground service performance. Tools such as service dashboards, public notice boards, progress visualizations, and community monitoring portals can directly enhance citizens' sense of accountability. Meanwhile, financial transparency practices require re-design and simplification to become more accessible and comprehensible to the general public. Increasing the user-friendliness of financial documents, incorporating infographics, and presenting budget-use summaries in plain language may strengthen the relevance of financial transparency. The results also suggest that fostering trust and participation alone cannot compensate for poor service performance; accountability arises not from sentiment or involvement but from visible, experienced governance outcomes.

Taken together, the measurement, structural, and correlational evidence converges toward a consistent empirical narrative: service transparency is the principal driver of perceived accountability in village governance, while the contributions of financial transparency, trust, and participation remain modest or nonsignificant. The findings reinforce the conceptual shift toward citizen-centric governance, emphasizing that the credibility and responsibility of public institutions are increasingly evaluated through observable and experiential service dimensions.

CONCLUSION

This study examined the effects of financial transparency and service transparency on perceived accountability in village governance, while also incorporating trust in village government and community participation into the SEM-PLS model. The findings show that service transparency has a significant positive effect on trust, participation, and perceived accountability, whereas financial transparency does not significantly affect those outcomes.

These results indicate that citizens assess village accountability primarily through visible and understandable service outcomes rather than through technical financial disclosures. Although service transparency strengthens trust and participation, neither variable significantly predicts perceived accountability. Overall, service transparency emerges as the main driver of perceived accountability in village governance.

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